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 Following the disintegration of the socialist system in Europe and the end of 
the bloc-based relations, American politics has changed the course of its opera-
tion. In present-day circumstances, southeast Europe is becoming increasingly 
prominent in American foreign-policy projections, particularly during Clinton’s 
administration. Clinton has defined a clear-cut policy towards Europe’s southeast 
due to its vicinity to certain neuralgic points of American engagement (Near East, 
the Caspian region, the Gulf, eastern Mediterranean). In this way American poli-
tics has proved its leading global role. At the time of scarcity of foreign-policy 
events, Clinton’s team has thus been served on a platter a major foreign-policy 
arena, in which its engagement – which has all the symptoms of a long-lasting 
one – has not proved too costly. 
 
 American Policy in the Southeast Europe 
 The falling apart of the socialist system in Europe has significantly changed the 
framework and the directions of American global strategy. Instead of confronting the 
great adversary – the Soviet Union, which resulted in strong ideological, political, eco-
nomical and military components – American politics found itself in a new position, 
without the direct, global rival, but with new areas of conflict, particularly in Europe. 
Instead of the confrontation in the centre of Europe, on the borders of two German 
states, and instead of two military blocks confronting each other, the new significant 
challenges to American policy have shifted to peripheral parts of Europe. 
 Within this constellation the Balkan area should be viewed, or correctly referred to, 
as the region of South East Europe1. Within the past relation of strategic competition 
 
 1 The latest political events in South East Europe are increasingly accenting the question of belonging to 
this region. It is significant that Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and even Albania are trying to distance them-
selves from the Balkan syntagm. Therefore, instead of the Balkans, the softer term South East Europe is lately 
used, which also calls for its political determination. According to traditional political division, the South East 
Europe consists of: Greece, Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the five states that have 
emerged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Yugoslavia 
and Macedonia).  
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between the two super-powers and their blocks, this area had a significantly lower im-
portance. Greece and Turkey were members of the NATO, and by that fact have drawn 
the attention of a part of the Soviet forces to themselves. Besides, on the Turkish terri-
tory a possibility to use the military bases in the vicinity of the Soviet borders also ex-
isted. Yugoslavia was a non-aligned country, and thus created a sort of a grey zone be-
tween the NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Romania), while Albania, when it left 
the Warsaw Pact in 1961, extended this non-block territory. 
 When the Cold War, and inter-block relations ended, the US became more and more 
involved in this area. New disagreements over Cyprus have increased the Greek – Turk-
ish tension, the change of regimes in Romania and Bulgaria called for American politi-
cal directions as well, and the overthrowing of the regime in Albania were opening new 
perspectives to American policy in the entrance to the Adriatic sea. But the most impor-
tant factor that influenced the stronger American engagement, even the military in-
volvement in the area of South East Europe, was connected with the crisis in the territo-
ries of the former Yugoslavia. 
 
 American Policy and the Crisis on the Territory of the Fomer 
Yugoslavia 
 By strengthening the policy of détente, and by a gradual opening of the East, the 
Yugoslav position as a non-aligned country began to significantly lose importance. In 
these new circumstances, it became clear to Washington that the danger of a possible 
Soviet military intervention exists no longer, and at the same time the failures of Yugo-
slav policy became openly analysed and criticised, especially in regards to human rights 
(Kosovo)2, but due to American focus on significant international developments (The 
Gulf, disintegration of Soviet Union, unification of Germany), the developments in 
Yugoslavia received secondary attention. 
 Unlike some other situations, when American policy was fed with misleading sig-
nals from the field, the diplomatic reports from Belgrade, as well as the analysis pre-
pared by the CIA, clearly foresaw the disintegration of Yugoslavia and future conflicts. 
But, through the support of the federal government led by Prime Minister Ante Mark-
 
 Ecobescu, N.: “Avoiding Marginalization of the Balkans”, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, No. 
1-2, 1996, pp. 50-2 
 The other division of the countries of this area has stemmed from the security arrangements, and the re-
searchers from the European Strategic Group of the EU include in the area the following countries: Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania and the four states of the former Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Ma-
cedonia and Serbia with Montenegro. 
 Lenzi, G., Martin, L., eds, The European Security Space, Paris 1996, pp. 23-4.   
 2 Schifter, R.: “Human Rights in Yugoslavia: Statement before the Foreign Relations Committee, 21 Feb. 
1991” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 4 May 1991, pp. 152-3 
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ović, at the time when this government had almost no political authority American pol-
icy was advocating the unity of the state that practically no longer existed.3  
 After the outbreak of the armed conflict in Slovenia, (June 1991), in Washington it 
was still believed that this was a local conflict that Europeans will be capable of solving 
themselves. President Bush clearly stated, in an interview, that Yugoslavia did not rep-
resent American strategic interest4, and only after the Intermediate Mission of the EU 
had failed, did the US diplomacy come into the light. 
 But, in the meantime, the conflict had already started. And although the plans for the 
military intervention, within the framework of the US SACEUR, were in place, at the 
time of the Yugo-Army attack on Dubrovnik, President did not approve this action.5 His 
military advisors were strongly against an American military involvement in the con-
flict. In this fraction that was firmly against the American military involvement in the 
conflict an important role was played by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Scowcroft was serving as Ameri-
can military Attaché in Belgrade, and Eagleburger was US Ambassador, therefore their 
assessments had a special weight in Washington. According to them, the conflict was 
about deep and complex ethnic problems that will take time to resolve, so US should 
not get involved. Besides, in an election year, Bush's administration was convinced that 
the American military engagement in the former Yugoslavia would be extremely 
counter-productive and that it would turn the public opinion against President Bush. 
 American military officials were also against military involvement. Failures in some 
previous military actions, as well as the unpopularity of land troops warfare, were used 
as the principal arguments against the intervention. What they were demanding from 
President Bush was the need for a clear definition of political and military goals, in or-
der to achieve a decisive victory, with a possibility for withdrawal. According to some 
assessments, General Collin Powell was the main advocate for such an approach, and 
his authority was sufficient to block the efforts by those calling for a decisive action and 
suppression of the Serb an aggression.6  
 At the end of his term, President Bush did show some interest in the crisis, which 
was eventually roused. Probably fearing that it might spread to the neighbouring Kos-
ovo, and thus involve additional actors, Bush sent a letter to President Milošević, warn-
ing him that the US will not tolerate further violations of human rights of Albanians in 
Kosovo. By this, a possibility of American military action, in case of spreading the con-
flict to Kosovo, was announced. 
 
 3 See: R. Lukich and A. Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union, Oxford 1966, pp. 307-20. 
 4 “Bush sieht in der Bewaltung der Krise in Jugoslawien zunachts eine Aufgabe der Europaer” Frank-
furter Algemaine Zeitung, July 10, 1991. 
 5 Quote: F.S.Larrabee, Us Policy in the Balkans...., p. 281. 
 6 Ibid.., p. 282. 
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 During the election campaign, President Clinton strongly criticised Bush's inactivity, 
stating that it only contributed to the deepening of the crisis7. But, in spite of that, some 
time had to pass before the course was changed. The process of decision making and its 
definition – from the assessment that it is only a local conflict with humanitarian conse-
quences – to the full acceptance of the thesis that, after all, this is a serious conflict, in 
which certain American interests can be found, was affected by several domestic and 
international factors. 
 On the domestic, American scene, Clinton made it clear that the issues connected 
with the development of American society, such as economy and health insurance sys-
tem, will have priority. The foreign policy was to be put aside on the whole, and along 
with that the possibility for a direct involvement in the territories of the former Yugo-
slavia. Only after the conflict had spread, after huge sufferings of civilian population, 
and of course, the constant reports from the field, did Clinton's administration begin 
contemplating the possible ways of its engagement. 
• Retirement of Joint Chief of Staff, General Powell, has somewhat weakened the 
opposition to the idea of military intervention, although the fear of a lengthy engage-
ment in the crisis with no solutions visible, remained. 
• In the centre of the political decision making the new administration was also 
divided. The State Department, led by Warren Cristopher, was for continuing the policy 
of careful monitoring and analysis of the crisis and searching for possible diplomatic 
solutions. On the other hand, the new National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and 
the US Ambassador to the UN, Madelaine Albright, were advocating radical policy, in 
which the American diplomatic action would be clearly backed by military support8.  
  From the perspective of international actors, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 
also in Clinton's time, was assuming some new contours that were pointing to some 
new threats, and at the same time, the possibilities for American action were opening.  
• American establishment became increasingly concerned over the possibility that 
the conflict would spread to the South Balkans and could draw in a number of states, 
which could then trigger off new Greek-Turkish tensions.  
• Criticism coming from the Muslim countries which claimed that Western, and es-
pecially American policy is very quick when it comes to reacting to the Muslim world, 
but that it intentionally does not wish to prevent the extermination of Muslims in the 
Balkans, were also taken as an illustration of the consequences that such a position 
could have on the American relations with Muslims. 
• Strengthening of Russian positions in Serbia, followed by a stronger insistence of 
Russian communist and nationalistic forces on the solution which cannot be achieved 
without Russia, were also noticed in the White House, where the fear that American 
engagement would endanger President Yeltsin's positions, as the principal point of the 
new American-Russian relations, was constantly present. 
 
 7 Quote: R. Lukich and A. Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals..., pp. 320-1.  
 8 Quote: F.S. Larrabee, U.S. Policy in the Balkans..., p. 283. 
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• Faced with the crisis of all international institutions that took an active part in the 
conflict, American policy was forced to get involved regardless of the extent on which 
this was used to prove European inability to solve its problems, or due to the fear that 
the conflict could spread before a solution was found.9  
 Viewing the developments in the former Yugoslavia as a European problem, Clin-
ton's administration started from a different evaluation of the new relations within 
Europe, and the position that the new, unified Europe has. All the announcements of 
political and military linkages within the European Union have been received scepti-
cally by Bush's administration, and in part even as an attempt at unnecessary competi-
tion that could endanger the existence of the NATO. On the other hand, Clinton, from 
the beginning of his term, took a different position, believing that a new identity of the 
EU members, as well as their capability for joint political and military action, could 
help in solving many post-Cold War crises. The intervention in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina was an excellent opportunity to test this capability for joint action, and also to con-
firm American stand that the US will not act on their own in practice. 
 By tying the action with his allies, Clinton has managed to achieve several goals. 
First, he demonstrated that his administration will not act, nor bear the price of the op-
eration unilaterally. Positioning the Bosnian intervention as a joint one, in which the US 
and its allies participate on equal basis, the possibilities for shaping a new NATO pro-
file, as an allied executive instrument where the allies decide jointly with the US, were 
opened. At the same time, along with numerous discussions and preparations for the ac-
tion, the time needed for preparing the public opinion in favour of American activation 
in Balkans was gained. The whole process took place between the statements on the one 
hand that American interests were in question, and on the other, the arguments that this 
is a long-lasting ethnic conflict that even America would not be able to solve.  
 Political officials at the White House slowly became convinced that the whole struc-
ture of the new world order was jeopardized by the inactivity of the main actors, and 
that such behaviour in one region could soon lead to a dangerous repetition in another. 
Even the threat of the conflict spreading to a wider area was not sufficient to speed up 
this decision and initiate the joint action.  
 Only after the Congress had announced that it would lift the arms embargo did the 
White House begin more radical preparations for a military action. Namely, it became 
apparent that such a decision would not be well accepted by American allies, who 
viewed the new armament as an opportunity for a further escalation of the war in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. This could have had a serious negative impact on the announced 
new relations between the US and the European Union. Having in mind the future pos-
sible enlargement of the NATO, and repeated general questioning of the value of the 
NATO as the organisation unable to act in a European conflict, Clinton's administration 
opted for action which led to Dayton and finally to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 In summer 1995, when the path that led to Dayton was opened, Clinton undertook 
action in order to: 
 
 9 R. Vukadinović, In Search of Security for the New Balkans, Vienna 1994, p. 11. 
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• reaffirm the strength, credibility and American leadership in the NATO, and save 
the NATO, 
• strengthen his presidential campaign, 
• convince the Congress and the Pentagon that American troops can safely go to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.10 
 By this the American leadership in the NATO was demonstrated, which also re-
sulted in the conclusion that there are no solutions in the new world order without 
America. The European allies have all taken up their roles in the post-Dayton process, 
but America remained the leading power in the Balkans; in Clinton's view America 
should continue to command, while Europeans are expected to do more11.  
 The American policy brought about this gradual pass into action in the territories of 
the former Yugoslavia through an array of diplomatic, political and military means. 
First, it was demonstrated through the mediation between the Croats and the Muslims, 
insisting on an alliance of these two nations against the Bosnian Serbs, in the Washing-
ton Agreement of 1994. Jointly with other members of the Contact Group, the Ameri-
can policy was searching for the solution in Croatia as well, in the areas occupied by 
Croatian Serbs, but when the proposal of the Contact Group was rejected, the operation 
led by the Croatian police and military forces opened the way to Dayton and the arrival 
of Americans in Bosnia. By the significant presence of its military personnel in UN 
forces in Macedonia, the American policy has clearly confirmed its readiness to prevent 
the conflict to spread and to preserve Macedonia. Being present at all three levels of the 
conflict, Clinton's administration has, from the beginning, demonstrated its intention to 
remain present in the South East Europe, which can, of course, give rise to various 
opinions. They relate to the role that the US has in the new world order, to the structure 
of relations that are being developed between the US and Europe, and to the attempts 
aimed at finding the new leading role for the US. But, along with these, the develop-
ment of new American strategic views that throw a new light on the area of the former 
Yugoslavia, must not be forgotten either.  
 
 Clinton's Strategic Engagement 
 Simultaneously with the engagement in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, a 
strong American activity in other countries of this area was initiated. Assessing the geo-
strategic position of Albania, its connection with Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as 
eventual dangers that might arise from the idea of creating a "Greater Albania", Ameri-
can policy has accepted Berisha's government, giving its full support to his authoritarian 
regime, until the moment when it became clear that Berisha was not the one who can 
move Albania towards modern era. Although reluctantly, the support was given to the 
new socialist government led by Fatos Nano who is aware of the need for good rela-
 
 10 S. Woodward in: M.J. Čalić, N.Gnessotto, J.Sharp and S.Woodward, The Issues Raised by Bosnia and 
the Transatlantic Debate, Paris 1998, p. 44. 
 11 Ibid. p. 45. 
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tions with the US and for American presence. Such a situation enables American policy 
to monitor the crisis in Kosovo from the Albanian side, and to directly influence Alba-
nian government. 
 During the first days after the fall of Causescu's regime in Romania, the US 
strengthened its presence in Romania. Primarily the US was interested in creating new 
political relations in which the heritage of the past could be quickly erased. Although 
not overly thrilled with President Iliescu, he was accepted as a leader with whom Ro-
mania could begin the transition processes. But only after Constantinescu, and the non-
socialist forces, had won the elections, was American engagement in Romania stepped 
up. American initiatives aimed at supporting the new government and strengthening the 
close relations, range from economic cooperation, to the announcements that Romania 
could be included in the second phase of the NATO enlargement. 
 In Bulgaria, the socialist rule, after the fall of Zhivkovlev's regime, considerably 
slowed the development of a better cooperation with the US. Although the dichotomy 
of power between the pro-Western President Zelev and the ruling socialists was clearly 
felt, the closer relations with America had to wait until the BSP was defeated at elec-
tions by the non-socialist forces. 
 As all three ex-socialist countries in question expressed their readiness to participate 
in the Partnership for Peace, this was one of the first opportunities for a closer Ameri-
can engagement. By monitoring the situation within the armed forces and suggesting 
the creation of the new relations between the civil and the military powers, a new model 
of military and political relations has been created. Although the situation in each of 
these countries differs, it is still apparent that the Partnership for Peace represented an 
efficient instrument for drawing these countries closer to the West, especially to the US. 
As these were military structures in question, which were in these countries relatively 
well organised parts of the state government, it was obvious that the American approach 
to them was of crucial importance. Due to the view that the military structures are rep-
resentatives of national desires, it is through them that the influence on political trans-
formations and the speed of joining the West is being attempted. 
 It is much easier to achieve these goals nowadays, when the three countries are pub-
licly declaring their wish to join the NATO. They see in NATO a chance for easing 
down the tensions, for closer ties with other Western structures (the EU especially), and 
for promoting the relations in which the NATO membership would open possibilities 
for a better life. 
 In the post-Cold War period, American engagement regarding its allies, Turkey and 
Greece, is faced with some new circumstances. First, the significance of American al-
lies in times when there is no longer Soviet, or Russian, threat has changed. The issue 
of human rights in Turkey, as well as the question of Kurds are, to a large extent, the 
central issues that American criticism is aimed at, and the strengthening of the Muslim 
oriented political forces has not met with Washington's approval, either. The situation is 
additionally burdened by the Greek-Turkish relations, especially concerning Cyprus. 
All this has resulted in the situation in which, relatively, there is not much left from the 
former American-Turkish strategic partnership. It has also led to a significant decrease 
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in American military and economical support to Turkey,12 while on the other hand, 
Turkey is announcing its reluctance regarding the use of American military bases on the 
Turkish territory in case of a crisis in the Middle East or the Gulf. 
 Since Turkey has an important geographical position, bridging two continents, it is 
impossible to imagine any dramatic breaches in American-Turkish relations. But the 
present problem does point to the fact that the two countries have different views on the 
issue of security and that in these new circumstances identical positions on some prob-
lems cannot be automatically taken for granted.  
 As the strongest Balkan country, and at the same time the only EU member from 
this area, Greece would have all pre-conditions to become the centre of the Balkan sta-
bility. But its policy regarding Macedonia has to a large extent exhausted Greek policy 
and created a number of unnecessary difficulties, not only in the Balkans, but at the 
European level as well. This has led to the situation in which the American policy had 
to become a mediator for Macedonia, and partly Albania. At the end of the Papandreu 
era, Greek policy had an opportunity for its stronger exposure in the Balkans, both by 
becoming Europe's representative in the area, and by promoting the Balkan interests in 
the EU. And although Greece has considerably improved its efforts in this direction, the 
traditional dispute with Turkey,13 which has come close to an outburst of hostilities on 
several occasions, remains an open sore, along with the open dispute over the islets in 
the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, there is also the danger of the spreading of the crisis in the 
South Balkans with the possibility of two NATO members being on opposite sides. The 
American policy has exactly that in mind, and never misses the opportunity to warn 
both Greece and Turkey that they are expected to calm down on the situation the Bal-
kans. This should also make it easier for the US activities in this area, where the only 
two NATO members from the Balkans should be the principal forces implementing the 
policy of alliance. 
 By its constant diplomatic initiatives, aimed at solving the issue of border in the Ae-
gean Sea, as well as the Turkish acceptance of the existing border, American diplomacy 
is also engaged in an attempt to solve the problem of Cyprus. As the issues in question 
are a part of the complex Greek-Turkish relations, a success that could encourage 
American policy has not been achieved yet.14 It is highly possible that in this new, post 
Cold War environment, when a high level of deconcentration of power is present, both 
countries believe that even the positions of powerful leaders from Washington are not 
 
 12 On problems existing in bilateral relations see: I.O.Lesser, Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After 
the Cold War, RAND 1992, p. 34. 
 13 The new security situation, according to one opinion in Greece, is especially burdened by constant 
antagonism with Turkey. “Military and demographically strong neighbour, which is neither democratic, nor 
connected with European institutions, is viewed with some distrust in Greece”. The same opinion sees  Turkey 
as the greatest beneficiary of the falling-apart of communist systems in the Balkans, since it provides 
opportunities for creating new alliances. 
 Y. Valinakis, Greece's Security in the Post Cold War Era, Ebenhausen 1994, p. 53.  
 14 A possible instalment of Russian missiles in the Greek part of Cyprus has opened a new crisis in Turk-
ish-Greek relations and enabled a whole new set of scenarios on the possible conflict between the two coun-
tries. 
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binding. Only in the moments of increased tensions between the two countries, may the 
US be considered an authority that can help calm down the situation. 
 Along with these bilateral contacts, aimed at demonstrating American interest in the 
areas of South East Europe, the US policy has also expressed its interest in making ef-
forts that could support gathering together of these countries. Having in mind the criti-
cisms that were directed at the EU concept of Regional Approach, American policy de-
cided to wait until a critical evaluation of this European project had been completed, 
and then launched its South Europe Cooperation Initiative, overriding the weaker points 
of the European concept. 
 In the political sense, the SECI demonstrated some essentially new elements of 
American policy:  
• after three years of hesitation, gradual entering into the region and building of bilat-
eral links, the SECI was meant to be a proof of American decision to be present in 
South East Europe, 
• this was to create the pre-conditions for the realisation of peace and security: from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Greek-Turkish relations, 
• the necessity and the strength of American leadership was yet again demonstrated to 
Europeans, 
• it was believed that with the eventual development of cooperation among the coun-
tries of South East Europe, the Muslim influence in the area would be weakened, 
and some Russian activities curbed.15 
 With quite differing views on the SECI, it was apparent from the beginning that the 
project would have a mixed reception and that there will be a number of countries not 
satisfied with this attempt of gathering together in South East Europe, instead of ap-
proaching the West, namely the EU.16 A huge area from Slovenia to Moldavia, in 
American opinion, should have been stabilised through a stronger cooperation among 
these 12 countries. These conditions should finally result in a possibility for increased 
participation of private sector investments in the area. After Dayton, and American en-
trance into Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with many initiatives aimed at solving the 
political and ethnic questions, the SECI was designed to become a pragmatic form of 
joint activity. As numerous economic and ecological problems are present in all the 
countries of this region, it was proposed, by the American side, to take a mutual ap-
proach to these problems, within the region of South East Europe. Of course, in a wider 
sense, it also expressed the expectations that the capability for solving mutual, regional 
economic and ecological problems would lead towards peace and stability. 
 
 15 R, Vukadinović, “South East Europe: Instabilities and Connecting Strategies”, Politička Misao, Vol. 34, 
No. 3. 1997. pp. 18-20.  
 16 See for example: J.Vranytzany-Dobrinović, “The EU, the SECI and Croatia”, Croatian International 
Relations Review, Vol. III, No.6/1997. 
 V. Mileta, “Miti balkanskega trga” Teorija i praksa, Vol. 35, No. 3. 1998 
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 And while the mechanism of SECI was slowly warming up, and at the same time 
opinions about its value are being formed, President Clinton has, in February 1998, an-
nounced his Action Plan for South East Europe. The Plan should increase the dynamics 
of American cooperation with those countries of South East Europe in which the de-
mocratisation process has considerably moved forward. The goals of this Plan, as pre-
sented by President Clinton, should be as follows: 
• consolidation of reforms, 
• development of regional cooperation, 
• assistance in integration in European and Transatlantic institutions, 
• strengthening the peace and stability around the Dayton countries.17 
 Achievement of these goals is being announced as a clear American desire to 
deepen the bilateral political, economic, military and civil forms of cooperation with the 
countries of this region. The US will act upon this in order to strengthen the regional 
cooperation, and finally, together with the EU members, to pave the way to the paths 
for merging of these countries into the architecture of European and Transatlantic insti-
tutions. 
 In concretising the activities that would follow, President Clinton announced that 
the intergovernmental work groups (which already exist in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slo-
venia and Romania) would be developing specific programs of cooperation, supported 
by various agencies from Washington. Counselling with American allies and partners 
would also be sought in order to widen the possibilities for cooperation.  
 Positively assessing the experience of Bilateral Work Groups for Military issues, it 
was also announced that similar groups would be formed for analysing the possibilities 
for economic cooperation. Their purpose will be to constantly research conditions for 
the development of economic relations, business, investments and all other forms of co-
operation. 
 By announcing the Action Plan, President Clinton has confirmed that his admini-
stration is determined to keep its presence in the South East Europe, and that along with 
the political and military means, other forms of activities that would on the regional 
level open doors for closer tie with the US, are being sought. At the same time, it is be-
ing expected that such regional cooperation, initiated by the American policy, will be 
attractive enough for all of the countries of the region, regardless of the tradition of 
their mutual relations, past or present disputes, or conflicts. By promising the integra-
tion with European and Transatlantic institutions, a clear message is being sent to the 
countries of the region that the road towards Europe lies in the development of regional 
cooperation, and that the US and its allies will be supporting such tendencies and re-




 17 Daily Washington File, February 10, 1998. 
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 American Interests in Southern Europe 
 The enlargement of the NATO will in the first phase considerably stabilise relations 
in Central Europe, and that region will become a part of Western security community. 
Viewed in a wider, global context, it can be said that the zone of instability will be posi-
tioned in the direction of the South, namely the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Caspian 
seas. In these territories there will be new challenges, conflicts and instabilities, which 
American policy, if it desires to be the leading force within the new world order, cannot 
oversee.18 From the initial passive monitoring of the war in the territories of the former 
Yugoslavia, to the present direct military engagement in the Balkans, and an active 
search for the options for cooperation in South East Europe, Clinton's administration 
has come a long way. During that time, the administration realised the fact that the in-
stabilities in this region may to a large extent threaten the security of Central Europe, or 
that the Greek-Turkish tensions may weaken the cohesion of the NATO, as the leading 
European institution.  
 Concerning the American role in the new relations, and in spite of a growing Euro-
pean cooperation, South East Europe remains an area where American policy will, 
seemingly, move in faster and faster. 
 In a global strategic analysis of the area, there are several important elements that 
must be considered, each affecting the new American engagement, which has led some 
Washington analysts to assess as the most coherent part of President Clinton's foreign 
policy programme. 
• South East of Europe is a strategic link to important Southern destinations that are 
of great importance (Caspian region), to potential points of crisis (The Gulf), and to the 
complex and unstable area of the Mediterranean. 
• The area of South East Europe contains present, as well as some potential, centres 
of conflict (Kosovo, Macedonia) which could have a considerable impact on the com-
plete architecture of security that is being created on the European scale. 
• In South East Europe, although minimal, the Russian strategic and political inter-
est which is not always compatible with the American one, can be detected. 
• For all those who think along the lines of "the Clash of Civilisations", this region 
is an area ideal for the expansion of Islam, or new religion-based tensions. 
 All this is calling for American presence, ranging from the military, which has al-
ready been demonstrated, to attempts at developing the strategies for economic connec-
tions, and activities that could result in higher engagement of American or European 
capital, thus drawing South East Europe closer to Europe.19 If the stabilisation of the 
 
 18 On assessments of value of this area and new instabilites, see: Z. Brzezinsky, The Grand Chessboard, 
New York 1997, pp. 123-50. 
 19 One of the leading American analysts of the Balkans is constantly arguing for the development of 
closer economic and regional cooperation among the Balkan states. He is correctly pointing out that due to the 
absence of a steady economic growth and development, many of the democratization-type reforms started will 
not succeed, which could lead these countries towards new instabilities and new ethnic conflicts. 
 
Vukadinovi}, R., U.S. Policy in the Southeast..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXV, (1998), No. 5, pp. 89—104 100 
                                                                                                                                              
situation represents American interests, then the American activity, especially in the 
field of economy, and in cooperation with the EU, is essential in order to jointly deter-
mine the goals that are to be achieved in this region, as well as certain demands that the 
countries of the area should meet. 
 In spite of the differences that exist among the group of countries in this region, and 
in spite of their value for American policy, it is obvious that the principal goals of 
American foreign policy may be listed as following: creation of democratic political 
systems, open market economy, multiparty political system, and respect for human and 
minority rights. Within this focus, American policy may be viewed in its concrete ac-
tion, leaving ample space for each particular country to be treated according to the pro-
gress it has made in the direction of the implementation of these American priorities.  
 Although it is said that Slovenia is already on its way to Europe, there are some 
other American views as well, saying that in spite of such closeness Slovenia could play 
an important role in connecting and bringing closer these countries to Europe.20 There-
fore it is considered that Slovenian development might be used as an incentive to the 
other countries in South East Europe. Convinced that it would be useful in getting 
closer to European processes, American policy wishes to see Slovenia in SECI. 
 Croatia, that had a much more difficult road in achieving its independence has, 
along with American assistance and support, often received criticism, mostly regarding 
the issues like reconciliation, return of displaced persons, implementation of Dayton 
and democratisation.21 Fulfilment of these demands should lead Croatia to Partnership 
for Peace, and eventually to its membership in the NATO. Having in mind the geo-
strategic position of Croatia, and American desire to be active in South East Europe, it 
is apparent that American policy needs Croatia. With Croatian infrastructure and com-
munications to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if it fulfils American demands, Croatia 
may become an important pillar for supporting the stability in the areas of the former 
Yugoslavia on the whole. Unstable Yugoslavia, filled with crisis points, may have a 
counter-balance in a stable Croatia, and American policy as an important partner. In 
case the situation in Yugoslavia becomes stable some day, American policy will insist 
on the intensification of the cooperation between these two countries, since it is thought 
that through the regional cooperation the regional security can be achieved. The close 
NATO ties could only help this process. 
 Clinton's administration has made Bosnia and Herzegovina its important foreign 
policy goal, and if the Dayton Accord survives, American involvement in the region 
 
 S. Larrabee, “The Balkans”, Strategic Appraisal 1996, ed. Z.Khalilzad, Santa Monica, RAND 1996, p. 
115. 
 20 By accenting the fact that Slovenia is situated on the crossroads between Central and South East 
Europe, the Slovenian interest in peace and stability in the Balkans is being illustrated. This could have sig-
nificant security and economic effects for Slovenia. 
 A. Grizold, “Varnost i sodelovanje v Jugovzhodni Europi”, Teorija in praksa, Vol. 35. No. 3. 1998, pp. 483-
4. 
 21 W.T. Montgomery, “Croatia's Roadmap to Partnership for Peace”, Croatian International Relations Re-
view, Vol. IV, No. 11, 1998, pp. 88-90. 
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would become even deeper. Dilemmas about the divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, or an 
integral state, have apparently been overcome in Washington at the moment. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina should remain an integral state, composed of two entities and three na-
tions, even if it means a stronger, and more permanent American and international in-
volvement. If the political preconditions for the functioning of such a state have been 
met, then American policy, together with the EU, will have to considerably increase 
their activities in the economic field and help this country to overcome the conse-
quences of the war. At the same time, along with the strict control of the behaviour of 
the neighbouring states – Croatia and Yugoslavia – American policy will probably, and 
at the right moment, attempt to strengthen the pressure aimed at the establishment of a 
free-trade zone,22 thus enabling easier economic connecting, which should lead to the 
emergence of a new structure of security relations.  
 Barely after it had stopped pressuring Yugoslavia regarding the war in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the crisis on Kosovo is calling for a new American engage-
ment in Yugoslavia. On the one hand, there is a desire of the Albanian population to se-
cede from Yugoslavia, and the dangers connected with possible violent changes of bor-
ders, which would probably result in a chain reaction in the whole Balkans. Milošević's 
brutal use of force has led the Albanians to the situation in which some forms of auton-
omy, or even a republic within Yugoslavia, are hardly acceptable. At the same time, 
Albania's aspirations calling for the unification of all Albanians living in Albania, Ma-
cedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro, may be seen by the US and Europeans as heralding 
new instabilities in the area. Tremors would be immediately felt in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, where neither Croatian nor Serbian people would want to live in an integral 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and soon demands for secessions and new drawing of borders 
would be brought up. Having all that in mind, American policy is still considering 
Milošević as a partner in the field, and he should be calming down the situation in Kos-
ovo and open the way for negotiations. Combining sanctions with an occasional an-
nouncement of the possibility to lift them, American policy is using stick and carrot tac-
tics to make Milošević cooperative, hoping that the current problems (Kosovo, Sandjak, 
Vojvodina and Montenegro) could weaken his regime, and that in such circumstances 
some opposition that could take over the leadership in the future would emerge. But, 
this desire for the development of a democratic Yugoslavia will probably seem a very 
distant goal for some time.  
 Macedonia was accepted by American policy almost from the very beginning of its 
creation. Due to American support and assistance, Macedonia has managed to resist 
some challenges in relations with its neighbours, and in most sensitive times the UN 
(with the leading American role) has created a sort of a buffer zone, thus excluding Ma-
cedonia from the detrimental developments in Yugoslavia. The geo-strategic position of 
Macedonia, as well as the still unsolved relations with its neighbours (even the issue of 
the official name of the state) along with the danger of the Kosovo crisis spilling over to 
Macedonia, are sufficient reasons for increased caution, and constant American pres-
 
 22 F.S. Larrabee, “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement”, in the: “Cri-
ses in the Balkans...”, quote from p. 292. 
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ence.23 Also, in case of any changes in the status of Kosovo, it would be difficult to 
prevent the Albanians in Macedonia (22% or 35% of population) from connecting with 
the new, greater Albanian state, and, of course, this could not be achieved in a peaceful 
manner. Therefore, by supporting the survival of Macedonia, American policy will be, 
at the same time, maintaining peace and stability in the whole region. 
 In Albania, American policy has taken a strong stance, and close relations with the 
Albanian army have been created through the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, 
American policy is carefully monitoring Albanian activities in the Kosovo direction, not 
supporting radical Albanians demands for changing the borders, or the creation of a 
"greater Albania". Reducing its humanitarian activities, and constantly calling for a po-
litical solution of the crisis, American policy is trying to motivate Albanians from Kos-
ovo to accept negotiations, believing that a form of broad autonomy, that would grant 
self-rule to Albanians, but keep them within the present Yugoslav borders, is still possi-
ble. Such ideas are accepted by Fatos Nano, but not by Mr. Berisha, who sees some 
chance for himself in the new elections only by means of the intensification of the cri-
sis. It is apparent that American policy, with its presence and its strength, will be able to 
control the Kosovo crisis, if it decides to do so. Therefore, any solution will be to a 
large extent influenced by the US: whether it will be a wide autonomy, or maybe some 
new Dayton. In the present situation, any such solution will be supported by the official 
Albanian policy as well. 
 Bulgaria and Romania, with their new, non-socialist governments, both have a 
strong interest for cooperation with America. They are intensively using the Partnership 
for Peace as a starting phase for their eventual fast admittance NATO, and accessing the 
EU gives them additional credibility in their steps towards Europe. Developing the co-
operation with the US, both countries have accepted the American assessment of the 
events in South East Europe, and are supporting all the measures that could contribute 
to a peaceful solution of the disputes and to the stability of the region. Along with their 
active support to SECI and the acceptance of Clinton's Plan for South East Europe, both 
countries are advocating regional cooperation as well, consider it useful and needed, 
aware that such position is at the same time the best reference for their accession to the 
EU. Therefore, American policy will have no problems with these two countries, and 
they will support any American goal in this area in the future as well, knowing that the 
American reward, in the form of accession to European and Transatlantic integration is 
waiting for them. And this is what both countries are interested on. It can, therefore, be 
expected that it will be through these two countries that American policy will attempt to 
build the relations of the regional, Balkan cooperation. This has a special significance 
considering the fact that there are no problems, nor tensions, existing between these two 
countries. A positive competition in the speed by which the European integrations are 
being accessed may be used as a stimulating factor that Washington will most certainly 
appreciate.  
 Traditional American allies, and NATO members; Greece and Turkey, will continue 
to be extremely important actors, but American policy will have to additionally work 
 
 23 See: S. Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, 
Paris 1997. 
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with them. Greek policy, at this moment, much more realistic of the two, is on the way 
of solving its relations with the neighbouring countries (Macedonia and Albania), and 
given its membership in the NATO, may be an important factor in the Balkans. Tradi-
tional Greek activities regarding the Balkan cooperation will not be abandoned in these 
new conditions. Although these activities at the time of open conflicts (Kosovo) do lack 
some importance, they are constantly promoting the idea of cooperation, which is not 
far from American and European ideas on the need for the cooperation in South East 
Europe. Americans will therefore support such tendencies, convinced that no initiatives 
that would be contrary to American policy could arise from them. Besides that, Greece's 
good relations with Milošević may be significant in calming down his policy, and for 
implementing pressure in favour of Dayton II. Open problems in Greek relations with 
Turkey will continue to be a significant obstacle in a positive development in bilateral 
relations among the two southern NATO members. In the long run, it may be presumed 
that Greece will attempt to block the Turkish approach to Europe, which is contrary to 
American interest. But, viewing it in the context of general political and economic rela-
tions, as well as the Greek membership in the EU, American policy will continue to be 
a very important factor that Greece will not be able to ignore. Although nowadays it 
does not have the power needed for solving the existing problems between Turkey and 
Greece, American leadership is still unquestionable, and many of the ties connecting the 
two countries guarantee future cooperative activities. Additionally, the similarity of 
their positions regarding the developments in South East Europe may only strengthen 
these relations, established long time ago. 
 Current American relations with Turkey, on the other hand, are significantly more 
complex. In the post Cold War relations, Turkish policy has more room for manoeuver-
ing, and influenced by domestic political forces it is not turning only toward the West, 
but is developing its options in the East and South as well. A country that used to tie up 
24 Soviet divisions in the past, and that was offering its territory to American military 
bases, today is viewed differently both by Europe and America. The threats of the 
strengthening of Muslim forces, the Kurdism question and some human rights issues 
have all put some negative aspects up front. But in spite of these facts, Turkish strategic 
importance remains big, even in the conditions of the new world order being created. 
This especially refers to American policy which is forced to connect almost all of its 
central political issues in the Euro-Asian area with Turkish policy. The activities of the 
NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the Sanctions against Iraq, Russian relations with 
the former Asian republics, Middle East peace and transit corridors for oil and gas form 
Central Asia – all these issues are, in one way or another, connected with Turkey. The 
growing Turkish ambitions regarding Central Asia are challenging some interests of 
Russia and Iran, and sometimes of America as well, confirming even more the need for 
maintaining the relations of alliance.  
 It is, therefore, apparent that, in spite of the complexity of these relations, and in 
spite of some oscillations in them, American policy simply cannot afford not to work on 
good relations with Turkey. American policy has for a long time now been suggesting 
to its allies to accept Turkey into the EU,24 and is aware that the SECI may be used as a 
 
 24 F.S. Larrabee, “U.S. and European policy toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin, Allies Divided: Trans-
atlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East”, R.D. Blackwell and M. Sturner, The MITI press 1997., pp. 166-9. 
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way to incorporate Turkey in the regional cooperation in South East Europe. Turkey is 
also very important in calming down the situation in the Balkans, where it can play a 
role of an American ally in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sandjak, and Macedonia, 
thus assisting the American plan for stabilisation and peace. Having all that in mind, it 
is not difficult to conclude that American policy will continue its efforts to maintain 
good relations with Turkey, to help resolve its disputes with Greece, and, at the same 
time, to carefully monitor internal Turkish developments, and protect the fruits of their 
cooperation so far. A more free, and more extensive Turkish engagement, especially in 
Central Asia, will be coordinated with American interests, along with the continuing ef-
fort to maintain the role of NATO as a principal link between Turkey and the US and 
the West.  
* * * * * 
 American engagement in South East Europe, today, has all of its clearly stated dip-
lomatic, political, military and economic instruments firmly set forth, with the intention 
to stay present in this area. Although these instruments are of different strength, volume 
and dynamics in different cases, they are transparent, and compared with the activities 
of the EU, for example, much stronger. This should, among other things, lead to the 
statement that it is a result of a wish for permanent activity in the area, which was not 
only directed towards ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a part of the plan 
to enter, and remain in the areas of South East Europe.  
 Through such activities, Clinton's policy has succeeded in: 
• Firmly positioning the US in this very important region of South East Europe, 
which has a long lasting value, especially considering the vicinity and the connections 
with neuralgic spots of American foreign relations activities (Middle East, the Caspian 
Basin, The Gulf, East Mediterranean), 
• Along with designing a new profile for Central Europe – by NATO enlargement 
and the creation of new security zones further to the East, and by calming down the 
situation in South East Europe – American policy has clearly presented itself as the 
leading power that can successfully operate on European soil, and by that, only reaffirm 
its leading role within the new model of the world order. 
• In its, not overly rich, foreign policy, entering the area of South East Europe is 
perceived as the biggest success of Clinton's administration. 
• And if viewed pragmatically, the whole operation was not too expensive, which 
is of significant importance for American public opinion, and unlike in some other 
American military operations, there were no human casualties. 
• Clinton's administration will, most certainly, continue its engagement in this part 
of the world, and this will probably be continued by the next American President, if 
elected among the Democrats. But since a variety of American interests are involved in 
these matters, and already viewed as long-lasting and inter-connected, it may be con-
cluded that American policy has firmly established itself in South East Europe and that 
it will stay here, regardless of the future tenant in the White House. 
 
Translated by the author 
